Deterrence is, on the surface, a simple and well-established political science concept. I can stop you from doing something I dislike via credible fear of punishment. That punishment need only be undesirable to you, not total. I cannot destroy all of your forces or cities, but I can take out enough of them to make you think twice before crossing me. I can make that threat credible in part by leaving some things up to chance. Why risk it?
Yet most politicians and (sadly) some analysts have a different understanding of deterrence. To them, deterrence is like a gas tank or battery. For any number of reasons, it depletes over time. One must then “fill it up” again by throwing a bunch of bombs and missiles at somebody — or even engaging in a more intensive ground intervention. Once restored, deterrence will then work the way it usually does. Or does it?
Deterrence proper depends on the reliability of a concrete mechanism. If you do X, I shall — or might — do Y. The presumption that deterrence can be “restored” implies the deterrence mechanism itself is not working properly. Inflicting limited punishment (“restoring”) does not make the malfunctioning deterrence mechanism work. Once the target recovers enough from the material effects of the attack, they can attack again.
Which then justifies another attempt to restore deterrence. One must imagine Sisyphus happy as he continues to throw away his precious TLAMs. This is, to be sure, just compellence in a Scooby-Doo mask. 1 But I’ve come to realize that the audience isn’t actually the enemy but one’s own domestic public. It’s about tough guy vibes.
Footnotes
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Compellence is “I am hurting you, and I will continue to hurt you unless you do as I say.” ↩